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COMMENTS
CALIFORNIA'S CORPORATE FRANCHISE TAX:
TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME?
INTRODUCTION
California levies a franchise tax on domestic and foreign
corporations for the privilege of doing business in California
and measures the tax by the amount of the net income derived
from business transacted in California during the preceding
calendar or fiscal year.' When the income of a taxpayer subject
to the franchise tax is derived from or attributable to sources
both within and without the state, California Revenue and
Taxation Code section 25101 provides that "the tax shall be
measured by the net income derived from or attributable to
sources within this state in accordance with the provisions of
Article 2," which adopts the Uniform Division of Income for
Tax Purposes Act." Formula apportionment is used to deter-
mine California source income only when the business con-
ducted both within and without California is "unitary" in na-
ture.3 Where a group of corporations constitutes a unitary busi-
ness, section 25101 authorizes the California Franchise Tax
Board to require that a combined report be filed by the busi-
ness to determine the unitary income of the group and the
formula factors for apportionment.4
In general, a corporation is part of a unitary business if its
operations are dependent upon or contribute to the business
conducted by the group. The concept is based on the theory
that the business activities within the state are considered an
inseparable part of a business carried on outside the state.
Business income attributable to a particular taxing state is
determined by applying an apportionment formula which con-
sists of various factors thought to be relevant to the production
© 1979 by Gordon Yamate.
1. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 23151 (West 1970).
2. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 25101, 25107-25140 (West 1970). See note 5 infra.
3. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., PAMPH. No. 1061, GUIDE FOR CORPORATIONS FILING A
COMBINED REPORT (1974). See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334
(1941) aff'd, 315 U.S. 501 (1941); Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan, 30 Cal.
2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
4. CAL. FRANCHISE TAX BD., supra note 3.
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of income (i.e., property, payroll, and sales), compared with
total worldwide income.5
The apportionment method for a unitary business is often
contrasted with "separate accounting." Under separate ac-
counting, business within the state is treated separately and
distinctly from business outside the state; the income is com-
puted as if the taxpayer's activities were confined solely to the
taxing state.' Such method necessitates the computation of all
intercorporate transactions on an "arms-length" basis.'
Formula apportionment has been adopted on the grounds
that it conforms more equitably to economic reality in distrib-
uting tax burdens, and that it remedies the alleged shortcom-
ings of the separate accounting method: use of separate ac-
counting to engage in wide-scale tax avoidance and the theoret-
ical problem of establishing an arms-length market price when
such a standard does not exist.'
5. See F. Keesling & J. Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of
Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42 (1960).
Section 25128 provides that "[aIll business income shall be apportioned to this
state by multiplying the income by a fraction, the numerator of which is the property
factor plus the payroll factor plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is
three." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 25128 (West 1970).
The unitary theory
reflects the belief that multinational corporation (MNC) parents will
tend to exercise strong centralized control over all parts of the enterprise
and treat each subsidiary as an interdependent part of a larger system.
Since all MNC subsidiaries are considered to be parts of the same unitary
business, intercompany transactions cannot produce a real economic
profit or loss and must therefore be eliminated from tax consideration.
Rather, income is not recognized for tax purposes until some part of the
MNC earns a profit from sales to an unrelated party.
Note, Multinational Corporations and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 89 H~Av. L. REv. 1202, 1205-06 (1976).
6. F. Keesling & J. Warren, supra note 5, at 43.
7. The "arms-length" standard requires that a hypothetical selling price be de-
termined, which treats the parties in the intercorporate transaction as if they were
bargaining in a freely competitive market situation.
Separate accounting is also the method generally adopted by the federal govern-
ment to allocate income between domestic and foreign corporations. Internal Revenue
Code § 482, the principle authorizing provision, attempts "to place a controlled tax-
payer on a tax parity with an uncontrolled taxpayer, by determining, according to the
standard of an uncontrolled taxpayer, the true taxable income from the property and
business of a controlled taxpayer." Tress. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1) (1968); [19781 4 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 2991. Under § 482, the Internal Revenue Service is authorized
to allocate or rearrange the incidents (i.e., gross income, deductions, credits, or allow-
ances) whenever necessary "to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income"
of the subject taxpayers. Lewis, Allocations (sec. 482)-General Coverage, [1975] TAX
MNGM'T (BNA) 327.
8. See generally, J. Zeifman, The Taxation by California of the Income of Multi-
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Despite the merits of the unitary concept of taxation, per-
haps no single area of state taxation has caused more conflict
between the international business community and state tax-
ing authorities than California's inclusion of foreign income in
the apportionment formula.' Enforced on a worldwide basis,
the unitary business doctrine has been a source of both political
and legal debate. The tax method was criticized as a deterrent
to foreign investment in California because of its discrimina-
tory burden on foreign businesses and was a focal point of
controversy in the amendment of Article 9(4) of the newly ne-
gotiated United States-United Kingdom Tax Treaty.'0
While opposition to the unitary tax method comes from
multistate and multinational businesses alike, unique prob-
lems exist when foreign operations, including both parents and
subsidiaries of California operations, are included in the uni-
tary business. Although corporations are not uniformly op-
posed to the application of formula apportionment, since the
formula may on occasion operate to reduce a corporation's Cal-
ifornia franchise tax liability by offsetting California income
with losses in its foreign subsidiaries or affiliates," the inequi-
ties imposed on the multinational corporation warrant a closer
evaluation of the applicability of the unitary doctrine. The
problems are both practical and conceptual and are cast in a
legal setting where statutory guidelines are minimal and judi-
cial guidance is sparse.
This comment examines those problems affecting the for-
eign corporation by first reviewing the historical basis of the
unitary concept and the development of its extensive applica-
tion by the California courts and administrative bodies. It then
explores the theoretical economic difficulties of employing the
apportionment formula on a worldwide basis as well as reviews
the administrative problems created by the combined report
requirement. The comment then examines the suggested legal
grounds for challenging the inclusion of foreign corporations in
the unitary method of apportionment, and concludes that any
National Corporations, Statement Submitted to the Committee on Revenue and Taxa-
tion of the California Assembly (April 17, 1978) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
9. See generally, Hearings on the Matter of the Unitary Tax before the Cal.
Franchise Tax Bd. (July 12 and August 22, 1977) (on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
10. Id.
11. See generally, Superior Oil v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal.2d 406, 386 P.2d 33,
34 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1963) and Appeal of Signal Oil, [1966-1971 Transfer Binder] CAL.
TAx REP. (CCH) 204-376 (Sept. 14, 1970).
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of the inequities suffered by foreign businesses will have to be
remedied by legislation.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITARY BUSINESS DOCTRINE
The Traditional Standard-Requirements of Due Process
The unitary business concept of taxation was first applied
to a foreign corporation in the leading United States Supreme
Court decision of Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax
Commission.'2 At issue was the constitutional validity of a New
York statute that imposed an annual franchise tax on a foreign
manufacturing and mercantile corporation for the privilege of
doing business in the state. The tax was computed by the State
Tax Commission at the rate of three percent upon the net
income of the corporation for the preceding year. 3 If the entire
business of the corporation was not transacted within the state,
the tax was to be based upon the portion of such net income
determined by the proportion which the "aggregate value of
specified classes of the assets of the corporation within the state
bears to the aggregate value of all such classes of assets wher-
ever located."" The taxpayer in Bass was a British brewing
corporation. Although all of its brewing was done in England,
the corporation sought a market in the United States, conduct-
ing sales through its branch offices in New York City and Chi-
cago.' 5
For the year in which the franchise tax was assessed, Bass
reported no net income for federal income tax purposes from
its Chicago and New York operations." However, the Commis-
sion computed a worldwide net income of over $2 million for
the corporation and, by allocating to New York income propor-
tional to the segregated assets located in New York, attributed
nearly $30,000 to the New York operation upon which the fran-
chise tax was computed. 7
Bass argued that the franchise tax was not based upon any
net income derived from its operations in New York but that
the New York statute arbitrarily allocated a portion of its net
income derived from business carried on outside the United
12. 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
13. Id. at 277.
14. Id. at 278.
15. Id. at 278-79.
16. Id. at 279.
17. Id. at 280.
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States. The taxpayer argued that such imposition of the tax
deprived the corporation of its property in violation of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment" and imposed a
direct burden upon its foreign commerce in violation of the
commerce clause of the Constitution."9
The Supreme Court sought guidance in the Bass case from
its earlier landmark decision, Underwood Typewriter Co. v.
Chamberlain," where a Connecticut statute imposed a similar
net income tax on corporations doing business partly within
and without the state. The amount of the Connecticut levy was
fixed by taking the proportion of the net income on which the
corporation was required to pay federal tax determined by a
comparison of the value of its real and tangible-personal prop-
erty within the state to the value of all its real and tangible-
personal property.2 The taxpayer in Underwood demonstrated
that, while forty-seven percent of its real estate and tangible-
personal property was located in Connecticut (thus attributing
forty-seven percent of the corporation's total net income to
Connecticut operations), in fact, $1.3 million of its net profit
was earned in other states and only about $43,000 was earned
in Connecticut. The Court concluded that such showing failed
to sustain an objection to the validity of the tax and noted:
The profits of the corporation were largely earned by
a series of transactions beginning with manufacture in
Connecticut and ending with sale in other States . ...
The legislature in attempting to put upon this business its
fair share of the burden of taxation was faced with the
impossibility of allocating specifically the profits earned
by the processes conducted within its borders. It, therefore,
adopted a method of apportionment which . . . reached,
and was meant to reach, only the profits earned within the
State.2
Simply stated, the taxpayer had failed to carry the burden of
proving that forty-seven percent of its net income was not rea-
sonably attributable to the manufacture of products, the sale
of which accounted for eighty percent of its gross earnings after
manufacturing costs. Since Underwood had not even at-
tempted proof, there was nothing in the record to show that the
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
20. 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
21. 266 U.S. 271, 280-81.
22. Id. at 281.
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method of apportionment was inherently arbitrary or that its
application to the taxpayer produced an unreasonable result. 3
The Court "determined that it was impossible to compute the
Connecticut manufacturing profits separately from the total
profits of the business, and concluded that the formula was
reasonably designed to achieve a fair apportionment, at least
in the absence of any express showing to the contrary.
24
In Bass the Court recognized that the company carried on
a unitary business (manufacturing and selling ale) in which its
profits were earned by a series of transactions beginning with
the manufacture in England and ending with sales in New York
and elsewhere. Since the manufacturing process resulted in no
profits until it ended in sales, the Court concluded that the
state was justified in attributing to New York a just proportion
of the profits earned by the company.
25
The Bass Court relied heavily on Underwood, making no
distinction between the fact that formula apportionment was
applied among the states in Underwood while the unitary busi-
ness in Bass transcended national boundaries. In fact, the
Court's decision does not reveal any consideration of the prob-
lem of extending formula apportionment beyond the United
States borders. The Court would permit the use of formula
apportionment of income from a unitary business to the extent
that "the formula must not be intrinsically arbitrary, and it
must not produce an unreasonable result."2
23. Id. at 281-82.
24. E.G. Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business
Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAx. L. REv. 171, 181 (1970).
25. Referring to its earlier decision in Wallace v. Hines, the Court stated:
A State, in imposing an excise tax upon foreign corporations in respect
of doing business within the State, may look to the property of such
corporations beyond its borders to "get the true value of the things within
it, when they are part of an organic system of wide extent," giving the
local property a value above that which it would otherwise possess, and
may therefore take into account property situated elsewhere when it "can
be seen in some plain and fairly intelligible way that it adds to the value
of the [propertyl and the rights exercised in the State." This is directly
applicable to the carrying on of a unitary business of manufacture and
sale partly within and without the state.
266 U.S. at 282.
26. 254 U.S. 113, 121 (1920). This standard was reaffirmed in Butler Bros. v.
McColgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 672, 111 P.2d 334, 339 (1941).
To be violative of due process, "the misapportionment must be palpable and the
burden is on the taxpayer to satisfy the exacting test." F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Director
of Div. of Taxation, 45 N.J. 466, 213 A.2d 1, 17 (1965). Moreover, the U.S. Supreme
Court has long recognized the practical impossibility of a state's achieving a perfect
[Vol. 20
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The California Approach
The Butler Brothers test. The California Supreme Court
has provided two general tests for determining whether or not
a business is unitary and thus subject to formula apportion-
ment. In its leading statement on this issue, the court, in Butler
Brothers v. McColgan,2 held that the existence of a unitary
business is conclusively established by the presence of: "(1)
unity of ownership; (2) unity of operation as evidenced by cen-
tral purchasing, advertising, accounting and management divi-
sions; and, (3) unity of use in its centralized executive force and
general system of operation. ' '28 Rejecting the taxpayer's show-
ing of a substantial loss from its California branch on the basis
of separate accounting, the court explained that when a state
adopts a formula for allocation of income to the various states
in which the business is conducted, a presumption arises that
the formula produces a fair result. The taxpayer then has the
burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, the
uniqueness of its California operation so that the formula pro-
duces an erroneous result. In other words, the taxpayer must
show "a variance from normal in either the California sales,
property or payroll, or in either expenses or revenues" in order
to demonstrate the taxation of extraterritorial values;2' sepa-
rate accounting alone is not sufficient.
The Edison California Stores, Inc. test. Six years later, the
California Supreme Court in Edison California Stores, Inc. v.
McColgan3 offered an alternative test that establishes a uni-
tary business where the operation of the business within Cali-
fornia contributes to or is dependent upon the operation of the
business outside the state .3 In Edison, a California subsidiary
contended that the application of a three-factor formula to the
combined income of its entire affiliated group amounted to
requiring a consolidated return."2 This, the taxpayer argued,
California could not require because it had no jurisdiction over
apportionment and that a rough approximation rather than precision is sufficient.
International Harvester Co. v. Commissioner, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947).
27. 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), affd, 315 U.S. 501 (1941).
28. Id. at 678, 111 P.2d at 341.
29. Id. at 677, 111 P.2d at 341.
30. 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183 P.2d 16 (1947).
31. Id. at 481, 183 P.2d at 21.
32. Under the federal income tax law, a consolidated tax return may be filed by
an affiliated group of corporations pursuant to Internal Revenue Code sections 1501
and 1504(a) with certain exceptions. Such consolidation treats the group as if it were
one corporation for tax purposes.
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the parent company. The court held that the action by the
Franchise Tax Commissioner neither involved a consolidated
return nor disregarded the separate entity status of the various
members of the group. Rather, the combined-report concept,
coupled with the apportionment formula as applied to the Cali-
fornia subsidiary, was consistent with the Butler Brothers deci-
sion.
Although the court felt that the taxpayer had met all the
elements of a unitary business under the Butler Brothers test,
the plaintiff in Edisori contended that the finding of a unitary
business between a Delaware parent corporation and its out-of-
state branches, organized as corporations in other states (e.g.,
the California subsidiary), should be distinguished from the
Butler Brothers situation which involved a single California
corporation with operating branches in several states. The
court failed to see any distinguishable difference between the
two cases and offered the contribution-dependency test of a
unitary system. Thus, the unitary concept was not disturbed
and its application was extended to subsidiary and affiliated
corporations.
Although the Edison decision declares a new test for deter-
mining the existence of a unitary business, it is unclear whether
such test, without the three unities of ownership, use, and oper-
ation, can sustain a unitary determination. In Chase Brass and
Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Board (hereinafter Chase Brass
1),13 the California Court of Appeal spoke of the contribution-
dependency test of Edison as the general test for a unitary
business and the Butler Brothers test as a more particular
statement of the test.3 ' However, in applying the tests in Chase
Brass I, the court only mentioned the three Butler Brothers
unities, implying that the contribution-dependency test may
be presumed to be satisfied if the elements of the more particu-
lar test are proven. Moreover, the State Board of Equalization,
in the Appeal of F. W. Woolworth Co.3 refused to interpret
Butler Brothers as holding that a unitary business exists only
if the three unities of ownership, operation and use are present.
The Board held that a unitary business may also exist if the
alternative test of Edison is satisfied. 6
33. 10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 86 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1970), petition for rehearing denied,
10 Cal. App. 3d 496, 87 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1970).
34. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 501-02, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
35. 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 204-806 (July 31, 1972).
36. In subsequent cases both the Butler Bros. and Edison tests have been consis-
[Vol. 20
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Chase Brass I left the unitary concept undisturbed but
broadened its scope of application by lowering the standards
for satisfying the elements of the three-factor test of Butler
Brothers.37 The court was faced with the task of determining
whether sufficient intercorporate unity was present to warrant
the unitary treatment of a group of vertically integrated corpo-
rations within the copper industry.38 Although the unity of
ownership requirement was easily satisfied, the court drew crit-
icism when it determined the existence of the unities of opera-
tion and use upon facts that have been characterized as those
"which would almost inevitably be present in any parent-
subsidiary relationship." 3 The facts indicating unity of opera-
tion were markedly different than the more common Edison
situation where all essential staff functions were performed for
the subsidiary by the parent. The Chase Brass I court noted
individually insignificant facts such as the "minor" purchasing
by the parent for a subsidiary, the use of the same accounting
firm, a common retirement plan and an isolated financing ar-
rangement at the prime rate between the parent and a subsidi-
ary to establish the unitary operation." The court found unity
of use in the reservation of major policy decisions by the parent
and the degree of cooperation existing among members of the
affiliated group.
State Board of Equalization
Since the mid-1960's, the California State Board of Equal-
tently applied and reaffirmed and have been given broad application. See generally,
Superior Oil Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 53, 34 Cal. Rptr. 545
(1963), and Honolulu Oil Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40, 34
Cal. Rptr. 552 (1963).
37. Note, Chase Brass and Copper Co. v. Franchise Tax Bd.: Intercorporate
Unity and State Income Taxation, 7 CALIF. W. L. REV. 508, 515 (1971).
38. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 500-01, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
39. Note, supra note 37, at 513.
40. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 502-04, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 353-54.
The court in Chase Brass I recognized the problem that the staff functions of a
vertically integrated enterprise were not so markedly unitary as in a horizontally
integrated business and explained that
in the case of horizontal integration, functions such as central control of
advertising of the same product, central purchasing, and the like are
designed to give advantages to the business despite geographic differ-
ences. In the case of vertical integration involving various steps in the
production and distribution, integration of staff functions probably will
be considerably less.
Id. at 502-03, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 353.
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ization has sustained the Franchise Tax Board's efforts to ex-
tend the application of the unitary method to foreign subsidiar-
ies and affiliates of California parent corporations and, most
recently, to a parent corporation that was organized and con-
trolled under the laws of another country. While such applica-
tions may not be amenable to a generalized rule that a unitary
business will necessarily include foreign operations, whether
they be subsidiaries or parent corporations, the decisions do
indicate an aggressive and thorough application of the Butler
Brothers and Edison tests.
Foreign subsidiaries. In Appeals of the Anaconda Co.,
et. al.' the taxpayer did not contest the Franchise Tax Board's
finding that Anaconda (California parent) and all of its domes-
tic subsidiaries were engaged in a single unitary business, but
did argue that several of its subsidiaries engaged in mining in
Chile and Mexico were not a part of the unitary business. None
of the foreign mining companies in question owned property or
did business in California, but each corporation's stock was
owned by either a Delaware corporation or a Minnesota corpo-
ration who were each, in turn, ninety-nine percent owned by
Anaconda. The Board concluded that the key to the relation-
ship was copper, as Anaconda owned and operated copper
mines in the continental United States, and copper was the
principle metal mined by the Latin American companies. In
determining that the foreign affiliates were part of the unitary
business, the Board noted that the three unities of Butler
Brothers were present" and that the integrated operation
among the Latin American affiliates involving the mining, re-
fining, and fabricating of copper represented the type of opera-
tional interdependence which lay at the heart of the unitary
business concept.43
Anaconda also appealed the Franchise Tax Board's deter-
mination on the ground that it was inconsistent with the Cali-
fornia courts' only decision relating to the inclusion of foreign
41. 4 CAL. TAx REP. (CCH) 204-759 (May 11, 1972).
42. The Board noted that the
unity of ownership exists by virtue of Anaconda's controlling stock owner-
ship in the companies here involved; unity of operation is evidenced by
the centralization of service and overhead functions; and unity of use is
established by the vertical integration of the copper operations and by
Anaconda's control, through interlocking top executives, of the major
management decisions of the Latin American affiliates.
43. Id.
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operations in the unitary business. Although the court held in
Chase Brass I that Braden Copper Co., a Kennecott subsidiary
operating copper mines in Chile, was not part of a unitary
business conducted within and without California, the Board
in Anaconda refused to interpret the Chase Brass I decision as
providing a general rule that foreign subsidiaries or affiliates
should be excluded from the unitary business. The Board ex-
plained that whatever the court's theory for finding the Kenne-
cott subsidiary in Chase Brass I to be non-unitary, the court
did not articulate it clearly, and the Board cannot speculate as
to what that theory might have been. The Board in Anaconda
then noted that the general body of precedent in the unitary
business area compelled the conclusion that Anaconda and its
Latin American affiliates were engaged in a unitary business."
In Appeal of Grolier Society, Inc., 5 the State Board of
Equalization extended the scope of the unitary business con-
cept to include foreign subsidiaries whose only link to Califor-
nia was through an out-of-state parent corporation, which also
operated a subsidiary in California. In that case, Grolier-
parent, who was headquartered in New York, directly owned
all of the domestic and some of the foreign subsidaries and
indirectly controlled other foreign subsidiaries through a
wholly-owned subsidiary. The Board rejected the taxpayer's
argument that there was an absence of any intercorporate rela-
tionships between Canadian and Latin American subsidiaries
and the California operations of the domestic affiliates on the
ground that a unitary business does not require an interde-
pendence between every segment of the foreign and domestic
operations. The Board relied on its earlier decision in Appeal
of Monsanto Co.," where it declared "the argument miscon-
ceives the unitary business concept. All that need be shown is
that during the critical period [the operating division] formed
an inseparable part of appellant's unitary business wherever
conducted."' 7 The Board went on to conclude the existence of
44. See also Appeal of F.W. Woolworth, 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 204-806 (July
31, 1972)(Canadian subsidiary of taxpayer was part of unitary operation); Appeals of
Simonds Saw and Steel Co., et. al., [1966-1971 Transfer Binder] CAL. TAX REP. (CCH)
203-785 (Dec. 12, 1967)(two Canadian affiliates were part of unitary operation);
Appeal of Wm. Wrigley, Jr. Co., [1966-1971 Transfer Binder] CAL. TAX REP. (CCH)
203-535 (Dec. 15, 1966); Appeal of American Can Co., 2 CAL. TAX CAS. (CCH) 201-
180 (Nov. 19, 1958).
45. 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 205-301 (August 19, 1975).
46. [1966-1971 Transfer Binder] CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 204-430 (Nov. 6, 1970).
47. Id.
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a unitary business based on the Butler Brothers and Edison
tests.18
Foreign-owned and -controlled parents. In perhaps its
greatest extension of the unitary doctrine to foreign businesses,
the Board of Equalization in Appeal of Beecham Inc. "' upheld
a determination that the income of a foreign parent, organized
and operating under the laws of the United Kingdom, and the
parent's subsidiaries, be included in the combined report. In
commenting on the propriety of such inclusion, the Board ex-
plained that it was unable to discern any difference when the
foreign corporaton is the parent rather than the subsidiary. The
following quotation from one commentator summarized the
Board's conclusion:
It seems clear, strictly as a logical proposition, that
foreign source income is no different from any other income
when it comes to determining by formulary apportion-
ment, the appropriate share of the income of a unitary
business taxable by a particular state. This does not in-
volve state taxation of foreign source income any more
than does apportionment-in the case of a multistate busi-
ness-involve the taxation of income arising in other
states. In both situations the total income of the unitary
business simply provides the starting point for computing
the in-state income taxable by the particular state. This
proposition, so far as foreign source income is concerned,
was recognized in the early Supreme Court case of Bass,
Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission [citation
omitted]. While the Bass case involved a single corpora-
tion, the rationale is just as applicable where a unitary
business is being conducted by an affiliated group of corpo-
rations, and even though some of the corporations are be-
yond the jurisdiction of the taxing state. This was in sub-
stance the holding of Edison Stores. 10
In summary, the California courts have yet to clearly de-
limit the unitary business concept, except to state "[iut is only
if [a corporation's] business within this state is truly separate
and distinct from its business without this state, so that the
segregation of income may be made clearly and accurately,
48. Id. 204-430. See also Appeal of AMP Inc., [1966-1971 Transfer Binder]
CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 204-013 (Jan. 6, 1969).
49. 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 205-635 (Mar. 2, 1977).
50. E.G. Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business: The Unitary Business
Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX. L. REv. 171, 205 (1970), as quoted
in Appeal of Beecham, 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 14,897-98 (Mar. 2, 1977).
[Vol. 20134
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that the separate accounting method may properly be used." 5'
The cases and administrative rulings show a strong reliance on
the three-factor test of Butler Brothers and the contribution-
dependency test of Edison to establish a unitary business,"2 but
the Chase Brass I decision may produce some potentially
disturbing results with parent-subsidiary related business.
By not distinguishing foreign businesses from interstate
operations, the courts have neither directly authorized the in-
clusion of foreign corporations in the unitary business, nor have
they ever expressly denied such inclusion. The Franchise Tax
Board has interpreted such silence as implicit authority to
include foreign operations in the apportionment formula, 3 and
51. 17 Cal. 2d at 667-68, 111 P.2d at 336.
52. While the three unities and the contribution or dependency tests may be
applied aggressively by the Franchise Tax Board to establish a unitary business, such
tests are by no means applied blindly. In Appeal of Scholl, Inc., the Board of Equaliza-
tion concluded that the operations of a domestic parent and its domestic subsidiaries
were not unitary with its foreign subsidiaries despite the Franchise Tax Board's argu-
ment of the presence of (1) integrated executive forces, (2) substantial intercompany
product flow, (3) free availability of trademarks and patents, and (4) over 50 percent
ownership of the stock of all foreign corporations by the domestic parent. While the
Board of Equalization explained that a number of factors crucial to the Butler Bros.
and Edison tests were ostensibly indicated, a closer examination revealed that factual
operations belied that indication. First, while there was some evidence of interlocking
directors during the appeal years, the almost total lack of financial or operational
reporting to the Chicago headquarters of the parent by the foreign subsidiaries indi-
cated that eastern hemisphere subsidiaries operated as an autonomous unit. Moreover,
while the parent owned a majority of the foreign subsidiaries' stock, its voting rights
were exercised pursuant to proxies given to one executive in charge of foreign opera-
tions, and while such executive was in charge of the eastern hemisphere operations,
no meaningful visits by executives of the domestic group were allowed. Second, while
both domestic and foreign operations generally dealt with foot and leg care products,
there was no substantial inter-company product flow between the groups, as sales by
the domestic group to the foreign group never exceeded one-half of one percent of the
domestic group's total net sales. The evidence indicated that so far as was material,
the foreign group designed, manufactured and packaged their own products for ulti-
mate distribution and sale solely by other foreign corporations. Third, while the free
availability of trademarks and patents is a privilege not usually afforded to separate
and distinct companies and is a clear indication of unity, the facts of this particular
appeal indicated that there was no combined international advertising of the Scholl
name; foreign and domestic market development were independent and parallel. Fi-
nally, in regard to the three unities test, only the unity of ownership requirement
appeared satisfied. Appeal of Scholl, Inc., CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 206-000 (Sept. 27,
1978).
53. It should be recognized that "the Executive Officer of the Franchise Tax
Board has publicly announced that the Board will pursue the combined reporting
concept just as far as the courts will allow." Cal. Certified Public Accountants Founda-
tion for Education and Research, Overview of California's Taxation of Multicorporate
Businesses with Activities Both Within and Without California 1-5 (1975).
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when contested, the State Board of Equalization has concurred
with the Franchise Tax Board.
CONTROLLING OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENT
Although the Butler Brothers and Edison tests differ as to
the particularities of the unitary elements, no court has found
the existence of a unitary business in the absence of pervasive
controlling ownership. Moreover, in Appeal of Jack Harris,
Inc.54 the State Board of Equalization stated that the unity of
ownership requirement is implicit in the contribution-
dependency test.
The ownership element is crucial to the unitary theory:
section 2510111 contemplates controlling ownership." The lack
of controlling ownership alone demands separate treatment for
the businesses regardless of how closely the activities are other-
wise integrated.57 Control requires that the various parts of the
system operate as a single enterprise with each part dependent
upon and contributing to the whole.5"
On two occasions, the State Board of Equalization has
held that where the taxpayer and another enterprise each own
fifty percent of the stock of a foreign corporation and each
exercises one half of the control of that corporation, the tax-
payer is not engaged in a unitary operation with the foreign
corporation.59 However, the Board has indicated that equal
stock ownership is not conclusive; certain operating agree-
ments entered into by two fifty-percent corporate shareholders
of a foreign corporation may substantially change the relation-
ship between the two shareholders so that one corporation's
fifty-percent stock ownership is the controlling interest.
For example, in Appeal of Signal Oil and Gas Co.," the
Board found that where a subsidiary corporation lacks a major-
54. [1966-1971 Transfer Binder] CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 203-546 (Jan. 3, 1967).
55. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25101 (West 1970).
56. See generally Appeal of Revere Copper and Brass Inc., 4 CAL. TAX. REP.
(CCH) 205-752 (June 26, 1977).
57. See F. Keesling & J. Warren, supra note 5, at 49. See also F. Keesling, A
Current Look at the Combined Report and Uniformity in Allocation Practice, 42 J.
TAX. 106 (1975).
58. J. Wilkie, Uniform Allocation of Income from Unitary Business, 37 TAXES
437, 440 (1959).
59. Appeal of Revere Copper and Brass, Inc., 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 205-752
(June 26, 1977); Appeal of Standard Brands, Inc., 4 CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 205-789
(Oct. 18, 1977).
60. [1966-1971 Transfer Binder] CAL. TAX REP. (CCH) 204-376 (Sept. 4, 1970).
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ity stock interest in its affiliate but has a controlling ownership
over operational matters, a unitary business operation exists,
and the parent is entitled to include the income or losses from
its subsidiary and the affiliate in its computation of income for
the California franchise tax. Although this determination pro-
vided a favorable result for the California parent corporation
taxpayer, since the business losses of a German affiliate of the
California corporation's wholly-owned Swiss subsidiary could
be included in the unitary business, such ruling explicitly au-
thorizes extending the extraterritorial reach of the unitary
business to allow the Franchise Tax Board to require the inclu-
sion of a subsidiary's or affiliate's income where such income
would increase the tax liability of the California operation.
The implications of Signal Oil are not completely clear. On
one hand, the Board, in comparing section 2510161 to its federal
counterpart (section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code)6"
adopted the substance-over-form approach that recognized
certain unitary aspects of the affiliate (i.e., the other one-half
owner of the German affiliate had relinquished his interest in
the operational control of that company, indicating that the
parent taxpayer would also control price negotiations) even
though the technical more-than-fifty percent stock ownership
requirement was not met. In part, Signal Oil relied on a federal
decision where two shareholders controlled one of two relevant
corporations but only owned two percent of the stock of an-
other. 3 In that case, the federal Court of Appeals held that,
notwithstanding such minority ownership, the stockholders
were in effective control of the latter company and section 482
was applicable.
Focus on the unity-of-ownership requirement as it relates
to foreign corporations is significant for two reasons. First, once
the unity-of-ownership test has been met, the other factors
pointing to a unitary operation are likely to be found. The
taxpayer then has the burden of showing that the three-factor
test, or alternatively the contribution-dependency test, is not
met, a task that most taxpayers find overwhelmingly difficult. 4
61. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25102 (West 1970).
62. I.R.C. § 482.
63. Charles Town, Inc. v. Commissioner, 372 F.2d 415 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 841 (1967).
64. See G.B. Wood, The Unitary Tax Controversy, 25 CAN. TAX J. 271, 273
(1977); R. Peterson, California Franchise Tax: Combined Income Report Affects For-
eign Companies, 44 J. TAX. 184 (1976).
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Second, because the ownership test for combining a parent
and subsidiary only requires that a parent own more than fifty
percent of the subsidiary's stock, the unitary concept raises a
serious issue of fairness. For example, a California parent cor-
poration may be subject to a tax on a portion of the foreign
subsidiary's income to which that parent is not entitled. Even
though the minority interest may be as high as forty-nine per-
cent, California requires that the total income of the foreign
corporation be included in the combined return and subject to
formula apportionment by the Tax Board. 5 Furthermore, con-
trol arrangements as discussed in Signal Oil are not uncommon
to multinational businesses; such arrangements may allow the
state to set aside the more-than-fifty-percent ownership test for
inclusion of affiliate income.
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF FORMULA APPORTIONMENT
Income Distortion
The Task Force on Foreign Source Income of the House
Ways and Means Committee (Task Force) recognized the issue
that states which apply the unitary method of taxing corporate
business income under an apportionment formula may be indi-
rectly taxing the income of related foreign corporations by ap-
portioning too much income to the United States." A unitary
business may be operating in a foreign country where wages
and property values are lower in proportion to income than in
the United States.67 If such a disparity exists, the unitary
65. F. Latcham, Unitary Doctrine in Applying Franchise Tax, Statement to
Franchise Tax Bd. on Behalf of Container Corp. of America, Xerox Corp., Colgate-
Palmolive Co. and Crocker National Bank 14 (July 12, 1977)(on file at Santa Clara
Law Review).
66. HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON
FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1977) [hereinafter cited as TASK
FORCE 1.
67. Indeed, legal counsel for one multinational business suggests that the worst
offenders are the payroll and property factors. The former was adopted in order to
provide some measure of the contribution of labor to the production of income. Pre-
sumably, this decision to use actual salaries and wages paid rather than the number
of employees would reflect the relative value to the company of the contributions by
each employee (i.e., the presence of the company president would be given greater
weight than the presence of a janitor). However, when such standard is applied on a
worldwide basis where wage rates may vary substantially, the payroll factor may
produce distorted results. For example, the salary of a U.S. executive may be double
that of his foreign counterpart, but he may be no more productive; yet, the U.S.
executive's salary is double-weighted in the apportionment formula. Statistics indicate
that California wage rates are among the highest in the world, which would suggest
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method may operate to apportion more income to the domes-
tic operation than would otherwise be acceptable if such for-
eign affiliate was treated as an independent entity operating at
arms-length. 8
From an economic viewpoint, formula apportionment pre-
sumes a "worldwide common market" where the economic
costs of doing business are equal." This presumption is rejected
by economists as it simply ignores economic reality.7 ° More-
that a disproportionate amount of income is allocated to California when the payroll
factor is used. J. Condrau, Statement by Union Bank of Switzerland to the California
Franchise Tax Board Regarding the Effect of Application of Worldwide Unitary Ac-
counting 14-15 (on file at Santa Clara Law Review). Statistics compiled by Mobil Oil
Corporation from government sources support the finding that this country maintains
higher wage levels than the rest of the world. T. Bagg, Taxation of Multistate Corpora-
tions, Response of Mobil Oil Corp. before the California Franchise Tax Bd. app. A-D
(July 12, 1977)(on file at Santa Clara Law Review).
Another commentator notes that
Wage levels are considerably lower in Japan, Italy or almost any other
country than in the United States for same work. In 1969, the cost of
engineering work in Japan was only 70 percent of that in the U.S. (Eng-
land was 75 percent, Holland 80 percent, France 90 percent). In 1972, the
cost of skilled construction labor in Japan was approximately $14 per day
including social charges. In Argentina, the cost was $7 per day. In Eng-
land, it was $10 per day. In the United States, the cost is about $25 per
day.
See R. Peterson, supra note 64, at 187.
The property factor encounters two problems. As in the case of wage levels, a
similar disparity exists as to the cost of plants or property. One writer notes that
it would have cost $244 million in California in 1969, to build an oil
refinery to produce 125,000 barrels per day; the cost of the same refinery
in Germany, however, would have been only about $190 million. Simi-
larly, in 1964-70, the average investment needed to provide employment
to one person in the rubber industry in the U.S. was $137,000, while an
average of only $58,000 was required outside the U.S.
Id.
The second problem deals with the fact that the property factor is calculated on
the basis of original cost (CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 25130 (West 1970)) rather than
current value as determined by current exchange rates. While the numerator of the
property factor, which represents California property is valued at original cost, the
denominator of the property factor, which represents property worldwide, is computed
by converting the original cost of all property worldwide at current exchange rates.
This often results in greatly understating the denominator, which increases the weight
of the property factor in favor of allocating more income to California. Even if the
business could be allowed to compute the denominator of the property factor using
historical exchange rates, which would be more comparable to the numerator, the tax
savings involved may not justify the additional administrative cost for the corporation
to annually calculate the conversion on its worldwide assets." See J. Condrau, supra,
at 16. See also F. Latchum, supra note 65, at 10.
68. TASK FORCE, supra note 66, at 28.
69. Id. See also F. Latchum, supra note 65, at 3-4.
70. Since capital markets are [not] perfect (especially at the inter-
national level) ..., this assumption of equal productivity cannot be
accepted. Factors of production are not wholly mobile, so that interna-
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over, the lure of foreign location by domestic businesses lies, in
great part, on the opportunity for higher profit margins due to
the comparative advantages that cheaper foreign labor and
capital markets may provide.
Exhange Rates
Variations in foreign exchange rates are significant to any
determination of a multinational corporation's income for ap-
portionment purposes. When a devaluation occurs, one cur-
rency becomes more valuable relative to another, thus produc-
ing losses for the holder of the devalued currency and gains for
the holder of the non-devalued currency. By taking foreign
book earnings as the basis for California taxable earnings,"'
foreign currency losses arising out of fluctuations in the value
of the dollar are converted to gains, and gains are converted to
losses. The conclusion is that computing a dollar gain or loss
reported from the books of a foreign corporation is not compat-
ible with computing the worldwide income in dollars for pur-
poses of California's apportionment formula.72
tional rates of return vary according to national factor proportions. The
labor-abundant economy is apt to offer relatively low wage rates but high
returns to capital and vice-versa in the capital-abundant economy. Thus
proper implementation of a factor-location formula would require use of
a production function in order to allocate capital income, not only on the
basis of amount of capital in each location, but also of the capital: labor
ratio in each.
Peggy B. Musgrave, International Tax Base Division and the Multinational
Corporation, 27 PuB. FINANCE 394, 400 (1972).
71. In many cases where the Franchise Tax Board issues a deficiency for the
franchise tax to a U.S. subsidiary of a foreign parent, the Board makes no effort to
determine the multinational's worldwide income on a comparable basis. Instead, the
Franchise Tax Board takes income determined under financial accounting standards
prescribed by the foreign jurisdiction (which may vary substantially from generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and tax accounting standards of the United
States) as the basis for determining worldwide income subject to apportionment. In-
deed, such translation and recalculation may be impossible. J. Condrau, supra note
67, at 7-8.
72. An illustration may make this point more clear. Assume that a California
corporation does business both within California and the United Kingdom. In its
operations overseas, the California corporation presumably must deal in British
pounds (or else find someone else willing to incur the exchange risk). Assume that the
California corporation transfers $2.40 in British currency to its British operation when
the exchange rate is £1 = $2.40. If the value of the pound drops to $1.70 by year-
end, the California corporation will report a loss of 70t. Compare this to the situation
of a British corporation, which has its parent located in London and a subsidiary
located in California. Operations of the foreign corporation in California presumably
must be conducted in dollars. If the British parent corporation sends £1 in U.S.
currency to California and the same rate changes occur, the redemption of U.S. cur-
rency into British pounds at the end of the year would result in a 70c gain to the British
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The income distortion is magnified when the results from
operations are translated into very strong or very weak curren-
cies since the gains or losses are magnified by the exchange rate
fluctuations. In addition, if California operations compose only
a small part of the total operations of a multinational corpora-
tion, the effect of changes in foreign currency rates will be
dominant.7 3 The exchange-rate fluctuations can also have an
adverse effect in determining the apportionment of income
because the property, payroll and sales associated with the
foreign operations may be reduced in value by a devaluation
of foreign currency, thereby apportioning a greater amount of
income to California. 74
The Judicial Response
The distortions caused by the apportionment formula have
been challenged on a number of occasions, but the courts gen-
erally have not been receptive to such arguments. 5 The Cali-
fornia State Board of Equalization has frequently disposed of
corporate appeals on the basis that the taxpayer has not carried
the burden of showing that the formula apportionment is dis-
tortive. 6 In John Deere Plow Co. v. Franchise Tax Board,77 the
taxpayer argued that adjustments should have been allowed for
differences in operating markets when the apportionment for-
corporation. If the California Franchise Tax Board takes the financial income deter-
mined to a British parent as the measure of income subject to formula apportionment,
it would thereby convert what would have been a loss to a California corporation into
an equal gain by a British corporation. Since most foreign corporations do not keep
their accounting records in the currencies of their foreign subsidiaries, they must either
incur the administrative cost of such translation or risk the potential distortion of
worldwide income. See J. Condrau, supra note 67, at 7-8.
73. Id. at 13.
74 F. Latchum, supra note 65, at 13.
75. An exception, however, involved an apportionment formula, which was based
solely on the ratio of the value of the corporation's tangible property within the state
to the value of all its tangible property. In Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina,
283 U.S. 123 (1931), the Court invalidated the one-factor formula after the taxpayer
produced evidence that its income was derived from three sources (i.e., buying profit,
manufacturing profit, and selling profit) which could partially be attributed to out-of-
state operations. The analysis submitted by the taxpayer indicated that 21.7 percent
of its income was attributed to North Carolina as opposed to the determination of
approximately eighty percent of appellant's income under the North Carolina statute.
The Court accepted the evidence as sufficient to conclude that the statutory method
"operated unreasonably and arbitrarily in attributing to North Carolina a percentage
of income out of all appropriate proportion to the business transacted by the appellant
in that state" and that taxes were laid beyond the State's authority. Id. at 135-36.
76. R. Peterson, supra note 64, at 186.
77. 38 Cal. 2d 214, 238 P.2d 569 (1951).
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mula was applied to its operations across the United States
because the formula operated to distort the productivity of its
California business and failed to reasonably reflect the propor-
tionate part of the unitary income attributable to California.
The taxpayer submitted evidence that its California op-
eration was not conducted so profitably as other jobbing houses
in the national system because of the higher wage and salary
levels, the higher ratio of dollars invested in net tangible assets
and the higher ratio of selling and general expenses of its San
Francisco operation compared to the average ratio of all in-
cluded U.S. houses.7" Although the California Supreme Court
conceded that such figures were accurately calculated to show
proof of variations from the norm, they rejected the taxpayer's
contention because the corporation had failed to take into ac-
count the underlying concept of formula apportionment in the
allocation of income from a unitary business-the fact that the
business done within California is not truly separate and dis-
tinct from the business done without the state as to reasonably
permit segregation of income by separate accounting. 9 The
court explained that the propriety of the allocation formula
does not require that the factors employed be equally produc-
tive in the taxing state as they are for the business as a whole.
The court emphasized that varying conditions in different
states where the unitary business functions must be expected
to cause individual deviation from the national average of the
allocation factors, but that more importantly, the mutual de-
pendency of the interrelated activities of the entire business
sustains the apportionment process. 0
In essence, the Deere decision exalts theory over form by
requiring strict adherence to the unitary business concept in
order to sustain formula apportionment despite inherent inac-
curacies. The Deere approach was reasserted by the California
Court of Appeal in Chase Brass and Copper Co. v. Franchise
Tax Board (hereinafter Chase Brass I/),11 where the appellant
taxpayer argued in part that 1) the three-factor formula was
intrinsically unfair, 2) the formula allocated to California more
income than the California portion of the unitary business
could possibly earn, 3) the payroll factor was arbitrary and
78. Id. at 222-23, 238 P.2d at 573.
79. Id. at 223, 238 P.2d at 573-74.
80. Id. at 224-25, 238 P.2d at 574-75.
81. 70 Cal. App. 3d 457, 138 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1977).
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unfair because it failed to account for differences in productiv-
ity of its employees in the separate mining, fabrication and
sales operations, and 4) the sales factor, which was computed
by gross sales, was not appropriate to determine net income
because no net income was produced by internal sales.8" The
court concluded that the taxpayer had not met its burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the three-
factor formula used was arbitrary or productive of an unreason-
able result. The court declared that it would be willing to afford
protection to the three-factor formula so long as it remains
within the limits of the "rough approximation standard,"
which recognizes that no method of allocation can precisely
determine the amount of income attributable to any particular
geographic area or part of a series of business transactions cul-
minating in the realization of profit, and any effort in this
regard must be more or less arbitrary or fictitious as a matter
of practical tax administration."
The Deere and Chase Brass 11 decisions indicate a reluct-
ance by the courts to deal with the hard issues of formula
allocation and offer little guidance as to the limits to which the
distortion of income will be tolerated; the rough-approxi-
mation standard appears to be more of a rationalization
for the formula's inaccuracies. Arguably, however, the disparti-
ties in economies on a worldwide basis would produce greater
distortion of income by using the allocation formula and could
provide a more compelling argument to limit its application
with respect to foreign business entities.
ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS
The Task Force recognized the additional problem of the
administrative burden that the unitary method places on cor-
82. Id. at 468-73, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 909-12.
83. Id. at 471, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 911.
Due process challenges were raised in Plaintiff's Brief in Container Corp. of Amer-
ica v. Franchise Tax Bd., Civ. No. 673-472 (Super. Ct. Cal., Oct. 23, 1979), appeal
filed, (Ct. App. Cal., 1st. App. Dist. Nov. 20, 1979) (hereinafter referred to as Plain-
tiff's Brief] (on file at Santa Clara Law Review). The due process arguments are three-
fold: (1) that California's present system of formula apportionment fails to calculate
fairly that portion of income reasonably attributable to the business done within the
state, (2) that due process requires that the amount of income apportioned to a particu-
lar state bear some rational relationship to the protection and services provided to the
business within the taxing state, and (3) that plaintiff's submission of such "strong
evidence" of a grossly distorted result by the apportionment formula raises a rebutta-
ble presumption that the tax method exceeds constitutional limits, which shifts the
evidentiary burden to the taxing authority. Plaintiff's Brief at 91-105.
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porate taxpayers, particularly those which are foreign-owned.
The Task Force noted, for example, that a corporation with one
manufacturing plant in a unitary state has to obtain, for that
state's tax purposes, the income, sales, property and payroll
figures of all of its affiliates operating worldwide if the activi-
ties of those affiliates are dependent upon or contribute to the
activities of the local corporation."
The problem becomes more acute for the foreign parent
with California subsidiaries. The Task Force noted:
[Tihis compliance burden could be particularly costly
because a foreign-owned foreign corporation ordinarily
would not otherwise keep the books of its operations out-
side the United States in terms of U.S. dollars or in a
manner which would conform to U.S. accounting con-
cepts. 5
In many cases, new information must be developed solely for
this limited purpose." Foreign-owned and-based corporations
also find that the combined report disclosure may violate their
corporate policy, and, in some cases, they argue that such in-
formation may not be disclosed because of foreign laws. 7
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution pro-
vides that treaties and laws of the United States are expressly
declared to be the supreme law of the land and will supercede
inconsistent state law. 8 Although the federal government has
adopted the separate accounting method and has retained the
flexibility to reallocate income between a domestic corporation
and a related foreign operation to prevent federal tax evasion, 9
it has not expressly required that such a system be adopted by
the states for state income tax purposes in lieu of formula ap-
portionment. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Bass'" indicates the Court's implicit recognition of
the state's right to administer a formula that produces a deter-
mination of taxable income inconsistent with the federal result.
84. TASK FORCE, supra note 66, at 28-29.
85. Id.
86. J. Condrau, supra note 67, at 6.
87. R. Peterson, supra note 64, at 185.
88. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
89. I.R.C. § 482. See note 7 supra.
90. 266 U.S. 271.
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It should be recalled that the Court in Bass permitted a deter-
mination of income for state tax purposes even though no fed-
eral taxable income was reported.
Nor does there appear to be any preemption by treaty of
California's unitary method of apportionment on a worldwide
basis. An examination of the numerous bilateral tax treaties
designed to prevent the double taxation of income by the
United States and foreign governments reveals no prohibition
of the use of an apportionment formula to allocate income for
state tax purposes. As a matter of treaty construction, Califor-
nia authorities suggest that federal tax treaties and agreements
with foreign governments providing for certain tax exemptions
be given a narrow reading to permit state taxation of foreign
corporations in the absence of an express prohibition." More-
over, a provision in the recently negotiated U.S.-U.K. Tax
Treaty that was designed to restrict the states' use of an appor-
tionment formula to within the nation's borders with respect
to British corporations failed ratification by the Senate.2 Thus,
there appears to be no federal prohibition on California's inclu-
sion of foreign operations in the apportionment formula under
the federal preemption doctrine.
COMMERCE CLAUSE
In an effort to define the scope of the Federal Constitu-
tion's commerce clause the Supreme Court in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens,3 provided that
Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature na-
tional, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of
regulation, may justly be seen to be of such a nature as to
require exclusive legislation by Congress. 4
As a practical matter, however, the Cooley doctrine provides
little guidance in the area of state taxation of multinational
businesses since the implications of such taxation cannot be
neatly classified as either wholly national or wholly local. 5
After abandoning efforts to establish a meaningful test
based upon distinctions between direct and indirect burdens on
91. See Legal Ruling, No. 163, [1955-1959 Transfer Binder] CAL. TAX REP.
(CCH) 201-117 (Dec. 5, 1958); Opinion NS-5551, 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (1944).
92. See text accompanying note 10 infra.
93. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 298 (1951).
94. Id. at 319.
95. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 235 (1972).
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commerce," the United States Supreme Court developed a
general methodology that involves 1) a finding of whether a
state burden on interstate commerce is "unreasonable" or
"undue" 7 and 2) a balancing of the competing demands of the
state and national interests involved. This methodology has
been substantially retained by the Court in dealing with state
taxation that interferes with interstate commerce.
In Dept. of Revenue of Washington v. Washington Steve-
doring Co.,"9 the Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier position
in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 100 that a state tax imposed
upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce that is
within the state is not a per se violation of the commerce
clause. Under appropriate conditions, a state may tax directly
the privilege of conducting interstate commerce.' 0' The Court
recognized that the purpose of the commerce clause is not to
relieve businesses engaged in interstate commerce from their
just share of the cost of state government even though it may
increase the cost of doing business. 02
Regarding the balancing test, the Court explained in
Washington Stevedoring that "the commerce clause balance
tips against the tax only when it unfairly burdens commerce by
exacting more than a just share from the interstate activity."'' 3
Based upon the income distortion theories discussed above, it
is arguable that the inclusion of foreign operations in the uni-
96. Id. Such rejection was most recently recognized in Dept. of Rev. of Washing-
ton v. Washington Stevedoring Co., 435 U.S. 734, 750 (1977).
97. See Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524 (1910); Seaboard Airline R.R.
Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
98. See Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-70 (1945).
99. 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
100. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
101. 435 U.S. 734, 745 (1978).
102. 430 U.S. at 288; 435 U.S. at 748, 750.
103. 435 U.S. at 748.
Question as to whether the balancing test was in fact employed in Washington
Stevedoring exists. Although the Court referred to the balancing needs of the com-
merce clause, the majority in Washington Stevedoring appears to have disposed of the
issue based upon the conclusion that respondents had failed to develop a factual basis
to show the unfair burden aspects of the State of Washington's business and occupa-
tion tax on stevedoring activities. Id. at 750-51. Defendant's Brief in Container Corp.
of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., Civ. No. 673-472 (Super. Ct. Cal., Oct 23, 1979),
appeal filed, (Ct. App. Cal., 1st. Dist. Nov. 20, 1979) [hereinafter referred to as
Defendant's Brief! (on file at Santa Clara Law Review), insisted, however, that the
Court's dicta in Washington Stevedoring does not represent the adoption of the balanc-
ing test to the area of state taxation, but "rather is merely part of a discourse of the
defects of [the! Carter and Weekes" decisions, which the Court expressly overruled.
Defendant's Brief at 137.
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tary business for apportionment purposes imposes an
"unreasonable or undue burden" on foreign commerce.
The undue burden tests developed by the Court appear to
be essentially the same as those developed in determining
whether or not there has been extraterritorial taxation in viola-
tion of the Due Process Clause.0 4 In Washington Stevedoring,
the Court reasserted its established guidelines that no undue
state tax burden exists when 1) there is a substantial nexus
between the taxed activity and the state, 2) the tax is fairly
apportioned, 3) the tax does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and 4) the tax is fairly related to the services pro-
vided by the state. 105 In light of the difficulties with the tradi-
tional apportionment standard, the Washington Stevedoring
guidelines may not be satisfied.
Although one commentator has suggested that the
'unreasonable" or "undue" burden doctrine and the
"balancing of interests" doctrine in those cases of state regula-
tion of interstate commerce are likely to apply equally to cases
involving state interference with foreign commerce, 06 the re-
cent decision by the United States Supreme Court in Japan
Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,'"7 indicates that a more
extensive consitutional inquiry than the four-part Washington
Stevedoring analysis'06 is necessary. In Japan Line, Ltd., the
County of Los Angeles levied property taxes on the assessed
value of foreign-owned cargo containers abroad foreign-owned
and -registered vessels that were used exclusively in foreign
commerce. The Court held that because California's ad valo-
rem tax, as applied to cargo containers, resulted in multiple
taxation of instrumentalities of foreign commerce and pre-
vented the federal government from "speaking with one voice"
104. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax Apportionment and the
Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX. J. 487 (1968).
105. 435 U.S. at 750.
106. L. HENKIN, supra note 95, at 236.
107. 99 S.Ct. 1813 (1979).
108. 435 U.S. at 750. Accord, Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 279 (1976).
In Japan Line, Ltd., the Court expressly rejected the municipality's premise "that
the Commerce Clause analysis is identical, regardless of whether interstate or foreign
commerce is involved. 99 S. Ct. at 1820. In distinguishing between interstate commerce
and foreign commerce, the Court fashioned two additional tests to the Washington
Stevedoring and Complete Auto inquiries: (1) does the tax notwithstanding apportion-
ment create a substantial risk of international multiple taxation and (2) does the tax
prevent the federal government from "speaking with one voice when regulating com-
mercial relations with foreign governments." Id. at 1822-23.
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in international trade, the tax was inconsistent with Congress'
power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and was
therefore unconstitutional under the commerce clause. 0 9
The Japan Line, Ltd. decision is significant in two re-
spects: first, the Court recognized that a state tax which is
apportioned in order to avoid multiple taxation may not
achieve the same result when one of the taxing entities is a
foreign sovereign"0 and second, the Court emphasized the over-
riding concern of the Framers of the Constitution that the fed-
eral government be able to exercise plenary power when regu-
lating commercial relations with foreign governments."' Such
broad observations by the Court suggest that the considera-
tions addressed in Japan Line, Ltd. may be appropriate in
assessing the propriety of the unitary method of apportionment
of state income taxes as applied to foreign operations. On
the other hand, the Court expressly narrowed its inquiry to
"whether instrumentalities of commerce that are owned,
based, and registered abroad and that are used exclusively in
international commerce, may be subjected to apportioned ad
valorem property taxation by a state.""'
Any discussion of the commerce clause necessarily in-
volves the issue of whether, by excluding foreign income from
109. Id. at 1824.
110. This determination results from the logic that apportionment will prevent
multiple tax burdens from arising when there is a tribunal capable of ensuring that
the aggregation of taxes is computed on no more than one full value. Since a foreign
sovereign may impose a tax on the full value of those instrumentalities of commerce
domiciled within that country and no superior tribunal exists, it follows that "a state
tax, even though 'fairly apportioned' to reflect an instrumentality's presence within the
State, may subject foreign commerce 'to the risk of a double tax burden to which
[domesticl commerce is not exposed, and which the commerce clause forbids.'
[citations omitted]" Id. at 1821.
111. The Court in Japan Line, Ltd. listed several ways in which federal uniform-
ity may be frustrated: (1) international disputes may arise over reconciling particular
apportionment formulae; (2) a state tax creating an imbalance in the international tax
structure may invite retaliation by foreign nations disadvantaged by the levy against
American-owned instrumentalities located in their jurisdictions; and (3) a state tax
may invite other states to impose taxes of their own, which could subject instrumental-
ities of foreign commerce to multiple tax burdens and prevent the federal government
from "speaking with one voice" in regulating foreign commerce. Id. at 1822-23.
112. Id. at 1819. Moreover, Japan Line, Ltd. dealt with the special case of ocean-
going vessels, which historically has been distinguished from those cases in which the
Court discarded the "home port" doctrine in favor of upholding the validity of taxes
on instrumentalities of foreign commerce on a properly apportioned basis. Id. at 1818.
This raises the question as to whether the cargo containers aboard the foreign vessels
are of a sufficiently unique character as to restrict the Court's analysis in Japan Line,
Ltd. specifically to the facts of this case.
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the unitary method of apportionment in the combined report,
the resulting preferential treatment afforded unitary multina-
tional corporations whose foreign operations would be ignored,
as opposed to unitary domestic multistate businesses, which
would still be entirely subject to the apportionment formula,
will be tolerated. It is arguable that the equal tax treatment of
interstate and foreign commerce is not only a legitimate state
interest, which should be carefully recognized in the balancing
test, but that such equal treatment is also required by the
commerce clause itself."'
This nondiscrimination rule, first advanced by Justice
Traynor in his dissenting opinion in Scandanavian Airlines,"'
has been recognized by both the United States Supreme Court
and the California Court of Appeal. In addressing the propriety
of a local property tax upon foreign aircraft, Justice Traynor
commented: "Obviously there is no discrimination if a state
taxes migratory property used in [interstate] commerce ....
Moreover, [the commerce clause] precludes discrimination
against interstate commerce.""' And in Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages,"' the U.S. Supreme Court, in determining whether a
state's nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax against peti-
tioner's inventory of imported tires stored within the state was
within the import-export clause's prohibition against state
levies of any imports or duties on imports, rejected the notion
that a nondiscriminatory property tax can have an impact on
the federal government's exclusive regulation of foreign com-
merce."7 The Court emphasized that a tax "cannot be used to
create special protective tariffs or particular preferences for
certain domestic goods, and it cannot be applied selectively to
encourage or discourage any importation in a manner incon-
sistent with federal regulation.""11 8 The Court reasoned that as
long as the property tax does not fall within a particular cate-
gory of imposts and duties on imports and exports, the tax will
not deprive the federal government of anything to which it is
entitled."'
In Zee Toys, Inc. v. Co. of Los Angeles,"'2 the California
113. Defendant's Brief, supra note 103, at 138.
114. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 43, 363 P.2d 25, 44, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25, 44 (1961).
115. Id. at 44, 363 P.2d at 45, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
116. 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
117. Id. at 286.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 85 Cal. App. 3d 763, 149 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1978).
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Court of Appeal held that a state statute, which permitted a
partial exemption from personal property taxation of imported
goods that plaintiffs stored and planned to resell, violated the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. Relying on
the Michelin decision, the court refused to permit different tax
treatment for goods solely on the basis of place of origin, 2'
recognizing that to do so would give foreign goods a competitive
advantage over interstate goods. If the nondiscrimination rule
becomes a factor in assessing the validity of California's for-
mula apportionment, the California corporate taxpayer may be
practically foreclosed from any remedy (i.e., exclusion of a for-
eign operation's income from the apportionmenf formula) de-
spite the merits of its challenge of the tax assessment on other
grounds.
STATE INTRUSION IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The Zschernig Decision
In Zschernig v. Miller,2 ' the U.S. Supreme Court carved
out an area of exclusive federal competence that arguably
should be extended to state taxation of foreign income. In
Zschernig, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of a state
probate statute2 ' that controlled the disposition of an Oregon
resident's estate to heirs residing in a foreign country. The
Oregon Supreme Court had earlier denied certain personalty to
the foreign nationals because reciprocity, required by the Ore-
gon statute, was missing. The Supreme Court concluded that
Oregon's probate law affected "international relations in a per-
sistent and subtle way" and although the states have tradition-
ally regulated disposition of property upon death, "those regu-
lations must give way if they impair the effective exercise of the
Nation's foreign policy. 1 2'
121. Id. at 773, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 756.
122. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
123. Oregon Revenue Statute § 111.070 (1957) provides for escheat in cases where
a nonresident alien claims real or personal property unless three requirements are
satisfied:
(1) the existence of a reciprocal right of a United States citizen to take property
on the same terms as a citizen or inhabitant of the foreign country;
(2) the right of United States citizens to receive payment here of funds from
estates in the foreign country; and
(3) the right of the foreign heirs to receive the proceeds of Oregon estates
"without confiscation". Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. at 430-31.
124. Id. at 440. The Court also noted that where the probate laws conflict with
a treaty, they must bow to the superior federal policy.
[Vol. 20
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The Zschernig decision represents a relatively new consti-
tutional doctrine of limitations on the states; what these limi-
tations are, and how far they purport to reach, remains to be
determined.' 25 A narrow interpretation of Zschernig, which
"excludes only state actions that reflect a state policy critical
of foreign governments and involve 'sitting in judgment' on
them,' 21 would offer only limited judicial grounds to attack the
apportionment formula inequities. The Court may also be sug-
gesting that the line distinguishing an area of federal compe-
tence be drawn "between state acts that impinge on foreign
relations only 'indirectly or incidentally' and those that do so
directly or purposefully" or "[bietween those that 'intrude' on
the conduct of foreign relations and those that merely 'affect'
them." 2' In any event, Zschernig at least suggests that applica-
tion of formula apportionment to foreign business entities may
be unwise.
California's Recognition of Exclusive Federal Competence
While the precise demarcation between the exclusive fed-
eral domain and legitimate state activity was still unclear after
Zschernig, 2 the California courts have dealt with similar is-
sues. In Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commissioners, 121
the California Court of Appeal struck down a state statute
requiring that public contracts be awarded only to persons who
agreed to use or supply materials manufactured in the United
States from substantially domestic raw materials.3 0 The court
held that this California "Buy American Act" was "an uncon-
stitutional encroachment upon the federal government's exclu-
sive power over foreign affairs, and constituted an undue inter-
ference with the United States' conduct of foreign relations.' '131
Like the statute in Zschernig, the court noted that the Califor-
nia "Buy American Act" had more than "some incidental or
In dicta, however, the Court implies that such preemption may occur even in the
absence of a treaty so long as a state policy disturbs foreign relations. Id. at 441.
Moreover, there is dicta that suggests the state action does not necessarily have to be
contrary to a federal policy; such conflict was not present in the Court's invalidation
of the Oregon statute.
125. L. HENKIN, supra note 95, at 239.
126. Id. at 240.
127. Id. at 241.
128. Note, The Supreme Court 1967 Term, 82 H~av. L. REv. 63, 240 (1968).
129. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1969).
130. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 4300-4305 (West 1966).
131. 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 224, 80 Cal. Rptr. 800, 802 (1969).
1980]
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indirect effect in foreign countries."' 3 The court recognized
that such a state statute "may bear a particular onus to foreign
nations since it may appear to be the product of selfish provin-
cialism, rather than an instrument of justifiable policy.' ' 33
Faced with the question of the validity of a county per-
sonal property tax assessment on foreign-owned and -based
aircraft, the California Supreme Court, in Scandanavian Air-
lines Systems, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,'3' held
that the power to tax airplanes engaged solely in commerce
with foreign nations is vested exclusively in the place of
true domicile, which jurisdiction may impose a tax on the
full value, to the exclusion of property taxation elsewhere,
whether upon an apportioned basis or otherwise.' 35
Although the court's application of the "home-port" doctrine,
which is peculiar to instrumentalities of foreign commerce such
as air transportation and ocean-going vessels, was sufficient to
dispose of the case,' 31 the court went further and noted
that taxation of foreign owned and based instruments of
commerce represents a field that is peculiarly federal in
132. Id. at 228, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
133. Id., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 805.
134. 56 Cal. 2d 11, 363 P.2d 25, 14 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1961).
135. Id. at 36-37, 363 P.2d at 40, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 40.
136. In Scandanavian Airlines, the California Supreme Court offered the follow-
ing explanation of the "home-port" doctrine:
By a series of opinions, covering a period of over a hundred years
[the United States Supreme Court] has developed a body of law dealing
with the power of local authorities to levy property taxes on instrumental-
ities of commerce which are transitory in character, and, in the course of
engaging in trade, come within the territorial limits of one or more of the
States of the Union. In each of the decisions embraced in the body of law,
the United States Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the
true domicile, the port of registration, or home port, of the particular
instrumeptality sought to be taxed.
Id. at 20, 363 P.2d at 29-30, 14 Cal. Rptr. 29-30.
Focussing upon the true domicile, the Court then developed the rule that an ocean
going vessel might be taxed at its full value in its home port, and that other states
where it engaged in commerce were not entitled to levy a property tax of any nature.
The rationale for such limitation lies in part upon the lack of a taxable situs in any
but the home port. Id. at 21, 363 P.2d at 30-31, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31, and upon the
necessity of protecting against double taxation. Id. at 32, 363 P.2d at 37, 14 Cal. Rptr.
at 37.
The court in Scandanavian Airlines proceeded to apply the home-port doctrine
to foreign-owned and-based aircraft flown exclusively in foreign commerce with but a
single United States port, after finding "no logical basis for holding that these air-
planes differ from other instrumentalities of communication with foreign nations, so
as to avoid that doctrine." Id. at 33, 363 P.2d at 38, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
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nature, without regard to such specific constitutional con-
siderations as the commerce clause or the due process
clause, and which must be left to the administration of the
federal government, even in the absence of any present
federal legislation thereon.137
Without addressing the question of whether the California
Constitution or any statutory provision provided a basis for the
tax, the court deemed it sufficient that no instance where any
state ever attempted to levy a property tax upon an instrumen-
tality of foreign commerce which was both owned and based in
a foreign country could be cited. The court recognized that
regardless of whether such assumption of nontaxability
stemmed from constitutional prohibitions or from considera-
tions of policy, to overrule such an assumption would open the
door to state taxation of ocean vessels, previously believed to
be nontaxable, and would invite retaliation. 38
A number of factors suggest that the system of interna-
tional taxation should be exclusively reserved to the federal
government.
Retaliation. One of the fears that compelled the California
courts to recognize federal preemption in Bethlehem Steel and
Scandanavian Airlines is potentially present in the California
corporate tax situation. One corporation warns:
In essence, the Franchise Tax Board has told California
entrepreneurs, "Feel free to invest abroad as you please
but you can expect your California taxes to be higher than
if you do not invest abroad." As a result other nations
rightly may believe they are being discriminated against.
This discrimination invites retaliation. In effect, the Cali-
fornia tax is a penalty for all firms which operate in Cali-
fornia and which decide to go to those corners of the earth
where land and labor are cheaper. To even the score those
foreign governments may choose to penalize firms operat-
ing in their countries which desire to expand to selected
countries. Such retaliations or even the suggestion of them
clearly implicate our foreign trade policy.'
Harmonizing international taxation. Federal interest in
preserving control over the taxation of foreign business opera-
tions is clearly indicated by the existing network of over thirty
137. Id. at 42, 363 P.2d at 43, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
138. Id. at 42-43, 363 P.2d at 44, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
139. Plaintiff's Brief, supra note 83, at 131.
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bilateral tax treaties. '"0 The Treasury Department seeks negoti-
ated treaties in the interest of harmonizing the tax system of
the United States with its treaty partners to minimize the like-
lihood of double taxation and to ensure the efficient adminis-
tration of the revenue laws of all parties."' The treaties also
attempt to define the appropriate amounts of foreign source
income that may be taxable for federal income tax purposes.
Arms-length standard. The unitary doctrine is contrary to
the traditional method of separate accounting that is used to
determine the income of affiliated entities within treaty na-
tions for federal income tax purposes."' To the extent that the
tax treaties reflect the "international rules of taxation" they
suggest a strong preference for recognizing transactions for in-
come tax purposes only if those transactions can be calculated
on an arms-length basis."' If California's unitary method of
taxation results in the taxation of income that would not be
taxed under the international standard, California may be tax-
ing foreign source income in such a way that treaty-based tax
harmonization goals are undermined."'
Finally, the problems of income distortion and the
combined-report compliance burdens on the foreign corpora-
tion suggest an area so laced with foreign affairs that state
intrusion would not be appropriate.
CONCLUSION
California's development of the unitary business doctrine
is multi-faceted. From the state taxing authorities' perspec-
tive, the courts firmly established the validity of the unitary
method of apportionment by well insulating this tax device
from challenge; the taxpayer faces a very difficult burden of
proof if forced to demonstrate that the formula result is arbi-
trary or unreasonable. Where the distortions of income are
minor, the apportionment formula will be upheld under the
"rough approximation" rationale. The judiciary has produced
two general tests for determining if a unitary business exists.
140. [19761 FED. TAX COORD. 2d (TAX RIA) 0-15100.
141. Tax Treaties with the United Kingdom, The Republic of Korea, and The
Republic of The Philippines: Hearings on Ex. K, Ex. 0, Ex. P Before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 226-27 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 Hearings].
142. See I.R.C. § 482.
143. 1977 Hearings, supra note 141, at 226.
144. Id. at 227.
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And the most recent treatment of the issue by the court of
appeal suggests an expansion of the unitary business to a more
loosely affiliated group of corporations. The State Board of
Equalization has responded in kind by broadening the defini-
tion of unity of ownership.
From the perspective of the international business com-
munity, the courts have evaded the problems that arise when
foreign corporations are included in the unitary business. As
noted above, the courts' silence amounts to tacit consent. The
position of the taxing authorities is unquestionably clear. The
aggressive approach of California's Franchise Tax Board in
applying the unitary doctrine and formula apportionment on
a worldwide basis represents the furthest extreme to which the
unitary concept has been developed.
An examination of whether California's tax policy has in-
vaded an area that is explicitly preempted by federal legisla-
tion or treaty, restricted by the commerce clause or deemed to
be a matter of exclusive federal competence reveals that the
judiciary may offer only limited grounds for challenging the
unitary treatment of the foreign corporation.'
Perhaps the greatest problem in challenging the unitary
concept of apportionment is the fact that the alternative
separate-accounting method provides little, if any, standard of
fairness in fixing income among affiliates and subsidiaries for
tax purposes. Additionally, California's Franchise Tax Board
would argue that under no circumstances is separate account-
ing an acceptable defense to an income determination based
upon formula apportionment.'" And in theory, the Board is
145. A number of these constitutional issues will hopefully be resolved by the
appeals court in Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., Civ. No. 673-462
(Super. Ct. Cal., Oct. 23, 1979), appeal filed, (Ct. App. Cal., 1st. App. Dist., Nov. 20,
1979). But, it is this author's view that the balance of judicial authority may not
produce a satisfactory resolution of the income distortion issue.
The dearth of cases which specifically address the problems of the inclusion of the
foreign operation in the apportionment formula is not surprising when one realizes the
disclosure dilemma that is placed upon the corporation, who seeks to contest a fran-
chise tax assessment. The corporation may be called upon to produce information
which it initially finds impossible to obtain (i.e., the worldwide apportionment factors)
from the foreign parent or affiliate. Moreover, if such is the case, the corporation can
do very little to appeal the deficiency assessment, since the information initially re-
quired must now be available in order to contest the arbitrariness or unreasonableness
of the result by the formula apportionment. While it is unclear whether California's
Franchise Tax Board can directly subpoena the required worldwide information from
the foreign corporation, it can clearly place that responsibility on the California opera-
tion over which it has jurisdiction.
146. Interview with Mr. Benjamin F. Miller, Tax Counsel for the California
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probably correct. A true measure of the unitary elements of a
multinational operation may well be impossible under the
present accounting framework employed by most multina-
tional businesses."17
Nonetheless, if California's franchise tax is to be adminis-
tered fairly and equitably, the income distortion problems aris-
ing from the application of the unitary concept of apportion-
ment to foreign enterprises cannot be ignored. In the 1977-1978
session, the California Legislature considered over half a dozen
pieces of legislation that would have restricted this apportion-
ment device. Although no legislative solution was reached, law-
makers should earnestly seek to develop standards which rec-
ognize and mitigate the distortion that presently occurs.
Gordon T. Yamate
Franchise Tax Board, in Sacramento, Cal. (Feb. 2, 1979).
147. The unitary business doctrine recognized that "[djue to the integrated
nature of the multinational corporation and the interdependency of its parts, clearly
defined and separable units of economic activity do not begin and end at political
boundaries." Musgrave, The UK. Treaty Debate: Some Lessons for the Future, 7 TAx
NOas 27, 28 (1978). For example, if a California corporation decides to expand its
operation to a Latin American country, the logical extension of the unitary business
argument would recognize that the foreign operation acquires a considerable amount
of business experience, expertise and technical resources that a comparable venture
by local businessmen of that foreign country would not possess. Such benefits derived
by the foreign operation from the California parent arguably produce a unitary tie
between the two operations; yet, present accounting methods do not focus on this
intangible "flow" in the calculation of business income.
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